Abstract. This article considers the question: should rights extended to cultural communities to help them preserve themselves include the right to discipline dissident members who violate cultural norms? The case of the Pueblo Protestants is employed to consider two important defenses of cultural rights (revisionist liberal and cultural communitarian) that offer conflicting answers.
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Cultural rights have received much attention in political theory. One irony, out of which critics of cultural rights make much hay, is that the very rights that are extended to shield cultural minorities from the effects of dominant majorities can, and have, been used by those very cultural communities to oppress their own internal minorities. For instance, Katherine Fierlbeck has criticized cultural rights on the grounds that they "may reinforce the marginalization of those who are already disadvantaged within that group."
i The implication is clear enough. Defenders of cultural rights are hoisted by their own petard--the solution they propose to the marginalization of one group of individuals leads to the marginalization of some other group of individuals. This is a serious charge that cannot be ignored.
The case of the Pueblo Protestants has attracted much attention in the literature because it provides a clear and concrete illustration of this issue. The Pueblo Indians of the south-western United States have been the beneficiaries of special groups rights that have allowed them to preserve a unique way of life. This distinctive culture is reflected in a "theocratic" form of governance that combines elements of native spiritualism and Spanish Catholicism. The internal minority problem had its origin in the decision of some community members to convert to Pentecostalism. When, naturally enough, the converts began to offend social norms by refusing to participate in communal ceremonies and by attempting to convert others, the authorities exercised their powers of self-government to discipline them. This raises an obvious question: should the right to discipline or expel those who violate cultural norms be included among cultural rights? While this article addresses this question by focusing on the Pueblo case, it has obvious implications for similar situations in which sub-national minorities exercise some degree of political authority over their own people. Examples range from a cultural community controlling a regional political unit by virtue of demographics (for example, francophones in Quebec, Inuit in Nunavut), to 3 ethnically-defined political units (for example, aboriginal reservations in North America), to control of publicly subsidized minority cultural industries (for example, Welsh-language publishing and the Welsh-language television channel Sianel Pedwar Cymru in the United Kingdom).
The Pueblo case has elicited conflicting responses, even from defenders of cultural rights.
Two in particular are worth examination because of their influence, the disparate nature of their conclusions and, as I will argue, because a careful consideration of their shortcomings may point the way to a more satisfactory resolution. One approach, which we will call revisionist liberal, defends cultural communities on the grounds that they contribute to personal autonomy. In conflict, the individual's interest in autonomy must take precedence over any interests of the community. Thus
Will Kymlicka, a leading proponent of this view, denies that the Pueblo community should have the authority to discipline its dissident members. ii A conflicting approach, which we will call cultural communitarian, rests its defence of cultural communities on their potential to contribute to individual self-fulfilment. That is, where conflict arises the individual's interest in autonomy must be weighed against the community's ability to make this contribution. Thus Frances Svensson, a proponent of this view, suggests that the Pueblo communities should be allowed to expel dissidents.
iii This article attempts to advance the debate about the treatment of internal minorities, and cultural rights more broadly, by problematizing the relationship between the individual and the community implicit in these approaches, and by elaborating a revised understanding that may form the basis of a more compelling defence of cultural rights. In brief, it argues that the emphasis revisionist liberals and cultural communitarians place on personal autonomy and community, respectively, leads them to rely upon conceptions of cultural community that cannot recognize the 4 complexity of individual self-identity. An alternative approach that allows the conflict between the values of autonomy and community to be transcended is developed by embracing a value that underlies both--"meaningful life". While no rash promises are made about the ability of this approach to finally resolve the internal minority issue, the article concludes by proposing principles for the design of cultural rights that are more sensitive to the complexity of self-identity.
Two Justifications of Cultural Rights
The Pueblo Protestant case provides an excellent basis for comparing how revisionist liberal and cultural communitarian defences of cultural rights address conflicts between individual freedom and communal authority. As we shall see, revisionist liberals and cultural communitarians frame the issues very differently because their approaches emphasize different values. Having justified cultural rights instrumentally as a precondition of members' personal autonomy, the revisionist liberal leaves little ground upon which to justify limiting religious freedom for the good of the community. viii It would be contradictory to include among cultural rights--justified on the grounds that they are a precondition of individual autonomy--the right to limit religious freedom.
Kymlicka says that once a cultural community has been protected, it should become a "cultural-marketplace" within which "decisions about which particular aspects of one's culture are worth maintaining and developing [are] there remains an "appeal" of last resort, an outlet for them--merger with the dominant society.
If the rules of the dominant society are imposed upon the minority community across the board, the minority community has no place left to go, no refuge in which its values and priorities can be recognized. Of two possible injustices, the former appears to be more acceptable than the latter, since it preserves the maximum openness of opportunity to members of both dominant and dependent communities. I believe that the differences in the assumptions that inform these conclusions are so fundamental that there is little hope of advancing the cause of cultural rights by continuing the debate. Instead I propose to advance the discussion by shifting the focus from conflicting justifications to complementary underlying values. In the case under discussion, we can begin by focusing on something they have in common--their accounts of communities that deserve protection.
Cultural Monism
While the revisionist liberal and cultural communitarian approaches offer different justifications for cultural rights, they share an understanding of the nature of communities that can warrant such 10 treatment. This section will develop two points. The first is that both approaches are driven by their inner logic to assume that only communities whose members can be distinguished from members of other communities can merit protection. This assumption will be called cultural monism. The second is that the assumption of cultural monism is problematic. In particular, it leaves those who invoke it with precious little resources to make sense of, or even acknowledge, the complex self-identities epitomized by people like the Pueblo Protestants who simultaneously identify with aspects of more than one community. Unlike the cultural communitarian's commitment to cultural monism, which is clearly illustrated by Svensson's idea of the multidimensional group (a community with "many interlocking dimensions" whose "members more or less permanently isolatable"), the relationship between revisionist liberalism and cultural monism requires more explanation.
The revisionist liberal adopts cultural monism as a strategy for translating claims about personal autonomy and community as a "context of choice" into a defence of special cultural rights. This is attempted by suggesting that there is a special relationship between the individual, cultural community and personal autonomy; that is, by claiming that one's capacity for personal autonomy is somehow circumscribed by one's community. Kymlicka does this in two moves. First, he ties the capacity for autonomy to a particular community by suggesting that, as contexts of choice, cultural communities make individuals aware "of the options available to them." Second, he plays down the possibility that individuals might sustain their autonomy by abandoning unviable communities and joining other more viable ones by suggesting that, while possible, this choice is "rarely easy'" In fact, he suggests that it is unreasonable to expect people to renounce membership in their particular cultural community.
xxi There are several reasons why only communities that meet the test of communal monism could satisfy these requirements and, thus, qualify for cultural rights. This suggests two 11 characteristics that would necessarily limit the range of communities that could qualify: if a community is to present enough options to sustain lives of autonomous choice, it must be fairly large and diverse; and, as a context of choice, a community must circumscribe its members' normal capacity to exercise choice. Thus it must transcend more limited communities that, under normal circumstances, do not make exclusive claims on their members' self-identities (family, religion, ethnicity Unlike the revisionist liberal, the cultural communitarian is willing to define communal boundaries. By defining these boundaries according to the assumptions of cultural monism, however, the cultural communitarian has difficulty dealing with the challenge posed by the Pueblo Protestants. In particular, he cannot treat it as a conflict within the community because his refusal to recognize the claims of unidimensional communities has left him in no position to give any independent weight to the Pentecostal community. In the world of the cultural communitarians, only the contribution of cultural communities to individual self-fulfilment warrants special treatment.
Thus the cultural communitarian must deny the complexity of Pueblo Protestant self-identities--they are either Pueblos or mainstream Americans.
But why, given that cultural communitarians justify cultural rights on the contribution 14 communities make to self-fulfilment, should cultural communities be privileged over such unidimensional groups as kinship associations or religious sects? As it turns out, Svensson's reasons are more pragmatic than principled, and none answers our critique. The first is that they resemble interest groups which already receive recognition. This does not acknowledge that interest groups are not accorded anything approaching cultural rights. The second is that the complexity arising from the fact that individuals usually belong to many such groups would quickly lead to the reassertion of "the principle of overriding individual rights." While the problem of complexity might justify the refusal to extend cultural rights to unidimensional groups in particular cases, it cannot justify a blanket refusal to consider their claims. The third reason is that the dimensional complexity of the multidimensional group, unlike unidimensional groups, "produces such characteristics as endurance over time, stability of identity, systemic interdependence, and relative autonomy, and these in turn play a crucial role in qualifying groups for special status while avoiding the problem of open-endedness." xxv This ignores the fact that many unidimensional groups exhibit the requisite stability and that many multidimensional groups do not. What should matter is the stability and importance of the group, not its dimensionality. While these reasons can certainly justify the rejection of the claims of unidimensional groups on a case-by-case basis, they do not add up to a principled justification for the rejection of such claims altogether. To reiterate, by insisting on limiting special recognition to cultural communities, the cultural communitarian is unable to recognize the possibility that the Protestants have constructed complex self-identities that depend upon sustaining identifications with both the Pueblo and the Pentecostal communities.
Thus the case of the Pueblo Protestants reveals problems with the assumption of cultural monism that neither the revisionist liberal nor the cultural communitarian approach is able to overcome. Both must deny the complexity of their self-identities. On the one hand, this leads the 15 revisionist liberal to take an ambiguous stance on the boundaries of cultural communities, and thus extend the scope of contexts of choice beyond credibility. On the other, the cultural communitarian responds by limiting special recognition to cultural communities, a move that appears inconsistent with the idea that communities that contribute to individuals' self-fulfilment warrant special
recognition.
An Alternative Approach
The key move in this proposal to advance the debate on cultural rights is to reject the assumption of communal monism and thus to recognize the importance of a wider variety of communities than those defended by revisionist liberals and cultural communitarians. This, we shall see, requires a different account of the relationship between individuals and communities, one that transcends, without rejecting, the revisionist liberal's emphasis on personal autonomy and the cultural communitarian's emphasis on community.
We begin this by considering the reasons Kymlicka gives for the importance of membership in cultural communities: i) they provide members with meaningful options as found in "contexts of choice"; and ii) they support "a secure sense of identity and belonging, that Whereas revisionist liberals emphasize the contribution of contexts of choice to personal autonomy, and cultural communitarians assume that only cultural communities contribute to self-fulfilment, the approach here would defend communities that function as contexts of values on the basis of their contribution to an underlying interest in leading meaningful lives (lives characterized by the pursuit of subjectively significant purposes). Such lives have two requirements--the freedom to form significant purposes and the freedom to pursue them--both of which may, under some circumstances, justify the extension of special rights to communities. A purposes, a community may warrant special rights where it sustains unique forums within which particular significant purposes may be pursued. For example, some purposes may only be able to be 18 pursued within a particular community, xxxii others may only be able to be pursued collectively.
xxxiii To understand the implications of this approach as it pertains to the freedom to form purposes and, later, to the Pueblo Protestants, I shall outline a brief account of the model of self-identity and agency that follows from it. xxxiv In this view, self-identity consists of the entire range of a person's identifications with communities, as well as the particular way in which he or she understands these identifications to relate to each other. Such identifications are formed either through subtle processes of socialization (being raised in a Pueblo community), or through conscious acts of choice (converting to Pentecostalism). While one would normally expect individuals to make such identifications with many communities, this is not necessary.
Given this conception of self-identity, agency takes one of two characteristic forms. In one, the agent treats certain aspects of his or her self-identity as given when forming a purpose and determining how best to pursue it. xxxv In the other form, the agent makes self-identity the object of deliberation, usually in response to meaning-threatening dissonance. This can arise when deliberation reaches conflicting or contradictory conclusions that reflect underlying inconsistencies in the contexts of values with which the person identifies. Such dissonance is resolved, if indeed it is resolved, either by transforming self-identity (by prioritizing, compartmentalizing, rejecting, reinterpreting or replacing identifications) or by removing the cause. In this, the driving force is the need to sustain meaning.
At this point, I seem to have constructed an argument against cultural rights. Recognition of the potential complexity of self-identity appears, as Svensson feared, to recommend the reassertion of "the principle of overriding individual rights." If self-identity can be as fluid as described, it seems reasonable to expect people whose communities are threatened to simply identify with some other, more viable, community. This is not unlike a conclusion reached by Chandran Kukathas. He rejects 19 cultural rights, even though he recognizes that "the breakdown or disintegration of such communities" might lead to "social dislocation or anomie," and argues instead for a strong account of freedom of association defined as the freedom "to form communities and to live by the terms of those associations." xxxvi If the approach being developed here is to have any credibility, it must explain why we are not compelled to follow Kukathas down this path.
One of Kukathas' reasons for rejecting cultural rights is that he thinks it would do no great harm since "groups are not fixed and unchanging entities in the moral and political universe."
xxxvii While my approach is certainly consistent with the suggestion that self-identity can be fluid, fluidity is not absolute. Rather, we can also acknowledge that self-identity may also be fragile. While it can exhibit fluidity when people voluntarily alter their identifications, self-identity can also exhibit fragility when people are involuntarily deprived of identifications that support their ability to form or pursue significant purposes. This can happen when a person is removed from a community or when the community is destroyed. This is especially so where the nature of a person's commitment to identifications makes it unthinkable to replace them with any of the available alternatives. xxxviii Thus, having been deprived of some community or communities, and been unable to identify with any viable alternatives, a person could be left incapable of forming or pursuing any significant purposes at all. The recognition in this approach of both the potential fluidity and fragility of self-identity is important because it can explain the existence of people who need access to their particular communities and of people who are able to move effortlessly between cultures. It also enables recognition that in some circumstances people may require special protection for their communities without having to invoke the assumption of cultural monism. Second, and this is the subject of the next section, it informs the development of general principles for applying these insights to concrete debates.
Reconciling Perspectives
In this section I suggest some general principles for the design of cultural rights that reflect the insights developed above and illustrate them with reference to the Pueblo case. these interests is justified absolutely, but, rather, both are justified by their contribution to the underlying value of meaningful life, in circumstances where they come into conflict, resolution should be sought by trying to reconcile individual and collective interests to show equal respect for everyone's interest in leading meaningful lives, not by allowing one set of interests to trump the other.
It is in the development of these principles, I believe, that the focus on communities as contexts of values really demonstrates its usefulness. Unlike communities defined, for instance, in terms of the practice of particular historical traditions, contexts of values cannot be protected directly because they have no independent existence of their own. Rather, they exist in the minds of those who share them and they are reflected in the projects that they inspire. Thus cultural rights must be designed to preserve the underlying conditions without which the context of values could not exist:
for example, relationships, processes of socialization and ways of life.
This focus on underlying conditions, rather than on particular values or traditions, is crucial because it encourages design of general principles to govern cultural protection that would generate creative tensions which, I believe, offer the best hope for reconciling individual and collective interests. I suggest four general principles, two for the design of communal protection and two for the definition of communal membership, which I believe would preserve what is most valuable in cultural communities while leaving maximal room for individuals to define their self-identities.
Two general principles for the design of protection follow from the requirement that it be consistent with respect for meaningful life. The first is that it be minimal. Protection is minimal when it is no more than necessary to sustain the community as a context of values and to exclude those whose beliefs or purposes are so at odds with those values that their inclusion would pose a serious threat to its survival. Such protection sustains a space within which the traditions of a community can be carried on without predetermining which particular projects or purposes will be favoured over the A second principle governing special protection is that it should be impermanent. Since protection is only warranted where it is required to preserve the community as a context of values, and where its members rely on it to sustain meaning, it can only be justified for so long as it is needed.
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This will surely disappoint those who consider this principle inconsistent with the desire of cultural minorities to ensure the survival of their community in perpetuity. xlii While this approach cannot ensure the survival of communities through future generations, I do not think that it should count against this principle. The impermanence principle simply reflects the fact that some individuals, in their pursuit of meaningful lives, will choose, and should be free to choose, to reject inherited identifications. Thus the ability of people to ensure their community's survival must be limited to their efforts to reproduce this desire in their young.
How impermanence is incorporated into cultural protection will depend upon circumstance.
It might be made explicit, say, by requiring community members to express periodic support for the protection. For example, the continuation of communal land ownership or village self-government might be made subject to approval by some specified majority in a vote. This would allow members to choose not to renew protection if they found it unnecessary or too burdensome. In other cases, impermanence might be implicit. For instance, were people to stop purchasing subsidized cultural products, support would simply fade away.
These first two principles presuppose the ability to define the boundary of the community or, more specifically, to decide who belongs. Without some definition of membership it would be impossible to know who should have access to protected cultural sites or who has a right to participate in decisions about retaining them. Two principles for governing the definition of membership criteria also appear to follow from our approach.
One principle is that members must be free to exit the community. This is similar to the impermanence principle in that it makes membership impermanent for individuals. Freedom of exit is valuable for a number of reasons. First, it reflects the potential fluidity of identity--respect for meaningful life requires the accommodation of people who choose to end their association with 24 particular communities. Second, freedom of exit allows respect for fluidity without undermining the ability of the community to sustain a context of values that others continue to value. This is important because a decision to leave a community does not, in itself, prove that the community is no longer valued by others. Thus while ensuring freedom of exit will probably have a transformative effect on some communities, xliii it need not undermine their ability to survive as contexts of values.
A second principle governing the definition of membership is that it should involve some obligation that demonstrates reliance upon, and commitment to, the community as a context of values. This could be monetary (for example, requiring members to buy subsidized cultural products) or non-monetary (membership may require a willingness to fulfil communal duties). These could be effected by requiring communities to create membership criteria, including definitions of rights and duties. xliv This should help to ensure that only those who really rely upon the community seek membership; and assuage the concerns of members who fear harm to the community from free-riders, and those of non-members who may resent the expense of supporting cultural rights that others experience as a costless benefit. In the case of the Pueblo, membership criteria could be logically related to the minimal bases described above (communal control of traditional homelands and village self-government).
These principles should create competing tensions that will respect both the collective interest in preserving the community and the individual interest in retaining flexibility. The establishment of minimal protection and obligations of membership should prevent individuals from taking action that would put the community at risk. With such criteria, the Protestants would have to make a choice.
They could remain in the community, comply with its rules and obligations (including, perhaps, some form of participation in communal dances), practice their Pentecostal beliefs off-reserve or in private, and work for change over the long term. Or they could exit the community, publicly practice their I believe this is a more satisfactory solution than the communitarian approach of simply allowing the community to expel dissidents, or the revisionist liberal position that the community should accommodate almost any new found identifications. It forces both dissidents and traditionalist leaders to recognize that their real choice is often not between their ideal conception of the community and one they think is flawed, but between having access to a community that does not meet all of their needs and no community at all. A community, at least one composed of human beings, is always a work in progress and a product of compromise. It is a willingness to participate, and a commitment to keep it going, that ultimately separates members from non-members.
An example, albeit an imperfect one, of how this might work in practice is provided by 26 Dozier's discussion of the Santa Clara pueblo. xlv In 1894 the Indian Agency in Santa Fe recognized a "conservative" faction in the pueblo as the de facto government. This was opposed by a "progressive" faction that, among other things, was against involuntary participation in communal dances, refused to participate in the repair of dikes where it only benefited a few, and judged some native customs by Catholic moral standards. Despite their differences, however, the dissidents continued to act in ways consistent with the preservation of the community. In particular, they showed respect for the Pueblo "values of unanimity and the need to express such values through ceremonial activity." Rather than secede and found a new village, which was no longer an option, the dissidents chose to "be in the pueblo but not of it." In practice, this meant that they participated in public works when they found them acceptable, and openly defied the governing faction when they did not. Overall, while their actions disrupted the functioning of the community, they were careful not to completely undermine it. The schism was repaired in 1935, when the factions agreed with an Indian Agency proposal to adopt a written constitution and an elective form of government. This resulted in a de facto separation of church and state.
Two aspects of this are especially worth emphasizing. First, while the village ended up in a situation similar to that advocated by revisionist liberals, the route by which they arrived at it was very important. Instead of moving immediately to a liberal compromise, a period of time elapsed (41 years) during which people could reorient their self-identities and reinterpret their identifications. This enabled the villagers to make radical changes in their community without destroying it or themselves. Despite its imperfections, this example draws our attention to the importance of letting people develop their lives and communities in ways that are meaningful to them. As Ralph Linton has noted, when changes in the ways of a community reflect the voluntarily choices of its members, "no element of culture will be eliminated until a satisfactory substitute has 27 been found.... there will be no point in the process of culture transfer where techniques for satisfying all the group's needs are not present." Where changes are involuntary, however, the results can be "catastrophic" since the "normal process of retention of old elements until satisfactory substitutes have been found is inhibited. The result is a series of losses without adequate replacements. This leaves certain of the group's needs unsatisfied, produces derangements in all sorts of social and economic relationships and results in profound discomfort for the individuals involved." xlvi A second significant aspect of this is that it suggests, contra the cultural communitarian approach, that while respect for community may ultimately require the expulsion of dissidents, attempts to provide maximal room for them while preserving the community are not entirely futile. Thus the dissidents at Santa Clara provide an example of how to express disagreements, even fundamental ones, while continuing to co-operate for the survival of the shared community and its core values.
Conclusion
This article has tried to advance the debate about cultural rights by developing an approach based on an essential interest in meaningful life. While no one would pretend that, if implemented, this approach would put an end to all conflict internal to cultural communities, the emphasis it places on meaningful life suggests that we might improve upon revisionist liberal and cultural communitarian approaches by transcending rather than rejecting their assumptions about the importance of personal autonomy and community. In particular, it holds out the possibility of taking a principled approach to the design of special cultural protection that is sensitive to the complexity of self-identity and the related risks of marginalization. In so doing, it offers to accommodate greater diversity than cultural communitarians could allow and provides clearer definitions of community and membership than revisionist liberals would provide.
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